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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ACTIONS AGAINST
NONRESIDENT MOTORISTS

Maurice S. Culp*

W

HEN this subject was discussed several years ago,1 statutes
in thirty-five states authorized service of process upon some
state official 2 in actions filed against nonresident motorists. The passage of such legislation has continued. Today, out of the forty-eight
states and the District of Columbia, apparently only Missouri, Nevada
and Utah do not make some provision for such service.
It is proposed herein to discuss the new statutes which have been
enacted since the previous article was written, to consider significant
changes and developments in older legislation, and to survey the
recent -judicial decisions interpreting these process statutes.
The recent statutes have rationalized in terms of consent by the
nonresident motorists. The· District of Columbia statute is typical: 3
"The operation by a nonresident or by his agent of a motor
vehicle on any public highway of the District of Columbia shall be
deemed equivalent to an appointment by such nonresident of the
director of vehicles and traffic or his successor in office to be his
true and lawful attorney upon whom may be served all lawful
processes in any action or proceedings against such nonresident
growing out of any accident or collision in which said nonresident
or his agent may be involved while operating a motor vehicle on

* Assistant Professor of Law, Emory University. A.B., A.M., Illinois; LL.B.,
Western Reserve; S.J.D., Michigan; author of articles in a number of legal periodicals.
-Ed.
1 Culp, "Process in Actions against Non-Resident Motorists," 32 M1cH. L. REv.
325 (1934).
2 In this study, as was previously done, inquiries were directed to public officials
in a number of states selected at random; answers indicate a very substantial use of the
nonresident motorist statutes. In the following states the number of services which have
been made under their respective statutes since they were adopted are: California, 456;
Florida, 480; Nebraska, 606; Ohio, 2894; Oregon, 398. This represents a substantial
number annually because all of these statutes are of fairly recent date.
Since 1933, 250 summons ,have been served in Michigan; in Texas, 266. 7,803
summons have been served from August 1, 1935 to January 30, 1938, under §§ 52,
52a of the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law. 62A N. Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney
Supp. 1938), §§ 52, 52-a.
8 D. C. Code (Supp. III, 1937), tit. 6, § 255b. Does the term "highway'' include
a private road, as it is used in these statutes? Held not, in Galloway v. Wyatt Metal
& Boiler Works, {La. App. 1937) 180 So. 206.

NONRESIDENT MOTORISTS

59

any such public highway, and said operation shall be a signification of his agreement that any such process against him, which
is so served, shall be of the same legal force and validity as if
served upon him personally in the District of Columbia."
However, as in the previous article indicated, there is no actual consent involved, and the true constitutional basis for such legislation is in
the general police power of the states.4 The Supreme Court of Kentucky
in Hirsch cv. Warren 5 predicated legislative power directly upon the
authority of the state to regulate the use of its highways by nonresidents. Since the bar and judiciary have become acquainted with the
substance of the decisions of the Supreme Court in Hess v. Pawloski. 6
and W uchter v. Pizzutti,7 no serious attempts have been made to question the basic constitutionality of these statutes. 8 The point of attack
has been against procedural details, particularly the methods of giving
'See Culp, "Process in Actions against Non-Resident Motorists," 32 M1cH. L.
REV. 325 at 326-331 (1934).
5 253 Ky. 62, 68 S. W. (2d) 767 (1934).
Chief Justice Taft in writing the opinion in Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U. S. 13
at 18, 48 S. Ct. 259 (1928), said: "We have also recognized it to be a valid exercise of
power by a state, because of its right to regulate the use of its highways by non-residents,
to declare, without exacting a license, that the use of the highways by the non-resident
may by statute be treated as the equivalent of the appointment by him of a state official
as agent upon whom process ••• may be served."
Does this explain the power of the New Jersey legislature to enact one of the
sections in its statute? N. J. Rev. Stat. (1937), § 39:7-7, provides that when a nonresident is involved in an accident, the magistrate before admitting to bail, shall require the nonresident owner or operator "to execute a written power of attorney to
the commissioner, appointing such commissioner his lawful agent for the acceptance of
service of process in any civil action instituted or to be instituted by any resident of
this state against such nonresident for or on account of any claim, demand or cause of
action arising out of such collision or accident." The section seems to be valid. It is
no more unreasonable than making operation upon the public highways the equivalent
of appointment of the commissioner as agent. It is very similar in operation to the
early New Jersey statute sustained in Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U. S. 160, 37 S. Ct.
30 (1916). It is important that the provision does not become operative until the
nonresident has been detained because of an accident. It should also be noted that this
section confines the consent to actions brought by residents of New Jersey.
6 Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 47 S. Ct. 632 (1927).
1 Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13, 48 S. Ct. 259 (1928).
8 Smith v. Haughton, 206 N. C. 587, 174 S. E. 506 (1934); Hirsch v. Warren,
253 Ky. 62, 68 S. W. (2d) 767 (1934); State ex. rel. Cochran v. Lewis, II8 Fla.
536, 159 So. 792 (1935); Kelso v. Busch, 191 Ark. 1044, 89 S. W. (2d) 594 (1936).
In Herman v. Dransfield, 209 Ind. 697, 200 N. E. 612 (1936), noted in 12
IND. L. J. 73 (1936), the Indiana statute was sustained against an attack based upon
the theory that the subject of service of process was not within the title of the act, providing for financial responsibility of motorists.
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notice to the nonresident defendant. 9 For example, in Hirsch v. Warren 10 the main objection was to the method of serving notice; the
secretary of state was not, by statute, compelled actually to notify the
defendant, only to write a registered letter, addressed to the defendant
at the address named in the petition, notifying him of the nature and
pendency of the action. In Kelso v. Bush 11 the Arkansas statute under
attack required the plaintiff or his attorney to send notice of service and
a copy of the process by registered mail to the defendant at his last
known address and to file the defendant's return receipt or the affidavit
of the sending party that he had complied with the statute.
The objection in either case was based on the probability that the
defendant would not receive actual notice. The Supreme Court of
the United States has not adopted the requirement of actual notice:
the test is whether the procedure outlined by the statute establishes
a reasonable probability that defendant will receive actual notice of the
pending action. 12 Both the Kentucky and Arkansas decisions seem correct in holding that their respective statutes meet this test. Registered
mail directed to the address given in the plaintiff's pleading or to the
9 Unless the service statute specifically mentions venue, it would seem that these
process statutes would have nothing to do with that subject. The courts in several
states have applied their general venue statutes to actions filed against nonresident
motorists. See Aversa v. Aubry, 303 Pa. 139, 154 A. 311 (1931); Kennedy v. Lee,
272 Ky. 237, II3 S. W. (2d) 1125 (1938); Carter v. Schackne, (Tenn. 1938)
I 14 s. w.- (2d) 787.
Under the recent Georgia statute, Ga. Laws (1937), pt. 1, tit. 6, No. 444, § 3,
p. 734, all courts in counties having jurisdiction over tort and criminal actions are
vested with jurisdiction over such cases. This seems to remove any question of venue.
Also in l_ll"ew York a summons may issue in any court in the state which has jurisdiction
over the subject matter. 62A N. Y-. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1938), §§ 52, 52-a.
This removes some of the difficulty formerly experienced in New York in the filing
of actions in courts of limited jurisdiction. See Skyer v. Williamson, I 55 Misc. I 8,
278 N. Y. S. 668 (1935); Gruber v. Wilson, 276 N. Y. 135, 11 N. E. (2d) 568
(1937).
10 253 Ky. 62, 68 S. W. (2d) 767 (1934). The secretary of state was required
to place his return address upon the letter, and file with the clerk of the court a report
of his action, including a copy of the letter and the return registry receipt if any.
11 191 Ark. 1044, 89 S. W. (2d) 594 (1936), noted in 24 GEo. L. J. 1003
(1936).
,,
The court disposed of the objection by alluding to the presumption that a
letter, properly stamped, has been received by the addressee when addressed to the last
known address of a person and is not returned in response to a return direction. It
might very well be that the defendant would refuse to receive the letter, suspecting its
contents, and service could never be completed if the affidavit of compliance would not
suffice. See note in 34 M1cH. L. REv. 1227 (1936).
12 Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U. S. 13 at 20, 48 S. Ct. 259 (1928).
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defendant's last known address seems to afford reasonable probability
that defendant will receive the notice.18
MANNER OF SERVICE

Since 1934 ten states 14 and Congress, for the District of Columbia,
have made provision for service of process upon nonresident motorists.15
18 It is possible under both statutes involved that the plaintiff may have deliberately
or through lack of diligence failed to ascertain the actual address of the defendant.
Then the objection raised by the writer of the note in 34 MICH. L. REv. 1227 (1936),
that the statute does not provide for a reasonable probability of actual notice, is valid.
But most, if not all, states have some provision for attacking a return of service where
there has been no actual service; and presumably such statutes would be available to
the nonresident defendant who had actually received no notice. As the Kentucky
court said, in Hirsch v. Warren, 253 Ky. 62 at 66, 68 S. W. (2d) 767 (1934):
"Mistake or fraud in the service of process is always possible. • • • In such cases there
are other ways of testing the validity of the process and other remedies to which the
defendant may resort • • • and no statute providing for the service of process has
ever been held invalid because of a possibility of mistake or an opportunity for fraud."
14 Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, Kansas, Montana, North Dakota, Virginia,
West Virginia, Wyoming. Citations to the statutes will occur later as various provisions
are discussed.
15
In addition, Congress by the Motor Carrier Act of 1935, 49 Stat. L. 563, 49
U. S. C. (Supp. 1937), § 321 (c), has required motor carriers engaged in interstate
commerce to designate an agent upon whom service of process may be made in any
action at law or in equity over which the courts of the state where it is operating have
jurisdiction. In default of such appointment, any agent of such motor carrier within
the state may be served.
There have been no reported decisions under the act so far. The scope of the
statute is quite broad, and opens the court of any state through which the motor carrier
is operating to any transitory cause of action regardless of its place of origin or the
effect upon interstate commerce. The states cannot of their own volition enforce such
a broad jurisdiction over persons engaged in interstate commerce. See Davis v. Farmers'
Co-Op. Equity Co., 262 U. S. 312, 43 S. Ct. 556 (1923); International Milling Co.
v. Columbia Transportation Co., 292 U. S. 511, 54 S. Ct. 797 (1934). See Farrier,
"Suits against Foreign Corporations as a Burden on Interstate Commerce," 17 MINN.
L. REV. 381 (1933).
The act of Congress seems to remove any contention that the exercise of state
jurisdiction would now be an unreasonable burden upon interstate commerce. Congress
indicates its intention not to have interstate commerce free from such actions.
Is the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce broad enough to compel
a person engaged in interstate commerce to submit to suit upon any transitory cause
of action in any state where it happens to be doing business? The Supreme Court has
gone far in permitting Congress to regulate other relations of interstate carriers. See
Virginian Ry. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U. S. 515 at 558, 559, 57 S. Ct.
592 (1937). But it is a very close question whether jurisdiction exercised by a state
court, under the terms of this statute, may not be so arbitrary and unreasonable as to
infringe due process.
Is such exercise of jurisdiction reasonable? There can be no question about it
where the cause of action arises within the state where the agent is served. But is the
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In addition at least nine other states have amended their original
statutes in some important particulars.16 The newer statutes are phrased
in the familiar pattern: they provide for service of process upon some
public officer,17 but service is not completed until notice of such service
is given to the defendant. The Arizona statute is representative of the
newer statutes: 18
"Service of process under section r shall be by leaving a copy
of the summons and complaint, with a fee of two dollars, in the
hands of the vehicle superintendent, or in his office during office
hours, and shall be deemed to be sufficient service upon such
non-resident provided: r. The plaintiff shall forthwith send
notice of such service and a copy of the summons and complaint by
registered mail to the non-resident defendant, and the defendant's
return receipt and plaintiff's affidavit of compliance herewith shall
be appended to the original summons and :filed with the court
same true where the action is brought in a state where neither party is a resident and
where the accident did not occur? The exercise of jurisdiction in such cases seems
unfair. Witnesses have to be imported; it is more difficult to bring out the facts.
If the action is brought in a state court, the process of the court cannot compel the attendance of nonresident witnesses. In one unreported case an Arkansas state court
overruled a motion to quash service under the act and sustained jurisdiction over a
suit between parties who were both residents of Oklahoma at the time the collision
occurred in Oklahoma. When the case came on for trial, however, counsel for plaintiff
took a nonsuit rather than risk an appeal on such a close question.
16 Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Wisconsin. Minor changes in other states are recorded in Cal.
Stat. (1935), p. 154, Stat. (1937), p. 2354, Vehicle Code (Deering, 1937), div. 7,
c. 1, § 404; Iowa Acts (1937), c. 134, §§ 513-526; Okla. Stat. Ann. (1937), § 47-1;
S. C. Acts (1935), No. 183, Code (Supp. 1936), § 437; Vt. Pub. Laws (1935), No.

II7.
17 The secretary of state is the officer served in Alabama, Colorado, Georgia, Kansas, Montana, and Wyoming. In Arizona process is served upon the vehicle superintendent, division of motor vehicles; in the District of Columbia on the director of
vehicles and traffic; in North Dakota on the commissioner of insurance; in Virginia
on the director of motor vehicles; and in West Virginia on the state auditor. Among
the existing statutes as of 1934, at least one change occurs. In Iowa the commissioner
of motor vehicles rather than the secretary of state is now served. Iowa Acts (1937),
c. 134, §§ 513-526.
In the past some difficulty has developed because the serving officer would leave
the process with an assistant officer. See Derrickson v. Bannett, 5 W. W. Harr. (35
Del.) 165, 160 A. 907 (1932). Apparently to remove this possible loophole for strict
construction, statutes in Arizona, Colorado, District of Columbia, Montana, North
Dakota, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming in substance provide that service shall
be made upon the public officer or by le(J!ling it in his office.
In New York, service of summons may now be made by leaving a copy with or
mailing it to the secretary of state at his office in Albany or by personally delivering it
to any one of his regularly established offices. See Teplitzky v. Lippman, 143 Misc.
244, 256 N. Y. S. 410 (1932).
18 Ariz. Rev. Code Ann, (Supp. 1936), § 1672 S (a),
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within such time as the court may allow, or, 2. That such notice
and copy of the summons and complaint shall be served upon the
defendant, if found without the state by any duly constituted officer qualified to serve like process in the state or jurisdiction
where the defendant is found, and the officer's return showing
such service to have been made shall be filed in the case within
such time as the court may allow...."

All of the recent statutes provide for notice of service, if by mail,
to be sent by registered mail. Eight statutes require a return receipt,1°
and the Virginia statute 20 stipulates that a return receipt shall be requested. Registered mail sent to the defendant's last known address
is sufficient in North Dakota and Wyoming. 21 The very early and
"model" Massachusetts statute now authorizes alternative methods
of giving notice. 22 Doubtless every such statute satisfies the requirements of due process of law. As pointed out in the previous article,2 8
first class mail directed to the last known address of the defendant
seems to afford reasonable probability that the defendant will receive
actual notice. The presumption that registered mail, though no return
receipt is required by statute, will either be delivered to the addressee
or a member of his family or an agent, or returned to the sender, is
even stronger. 2 '
The courts have continued to give such statutes a strict construc10 Ala. Gen. Acts (1935), No. 32, § 1, p. 63, Code (Cum. Supp. 1936), § 9454
(1); Ariz. Rev. Code (Supp. 1936), § 1672 S (a); Colo. Sess. Laws (1937), c. 92,
§ 3; D. C. Code (Supp. 1937), tit. 6, § 255b; Ga. Laws (1937), pt. 1, tit. 6, No.
444, § 2, p. 734; Mont. Laws (1937), c. IO, § 4; N. D. Laws (1935), c. 174,
§ 1; W. Va. Acts (1935), c. 61, p. 256, Acts (1937), c. 47, p. 198, Code Ann.
(193_7), § 5555 (1) (a).
20 Va. Acts (1938), c. 26, p. 32. Provision first found in Laws (1934), p. 392.
21 N. D. Laws (1935), c. 174, § 1; Wyo. Sess. Laws (1935), c. 43, § 1.
22 Mass. Ann. Laws (1932), c. 90, § 3C. (1) If the nonresident operates a
vehicle which is registered in another state, notice is sent by registered mail to the
registration address, and plaintiff's affidavit of compliance and the return receipt are
required. ( 2) If the nonresident is not registered or is not the holder of a license •in
another state, notice is sent by registered return receipt mail to the last address known
to plain ti ff.
28 Culp, ''Process in Actions against Non-Resident Motorists," 32 M1cH. L. REV.
325 at 339-340 (1934).
2 ' Courts continue to apply such statutes to only such accidents which have happened after the passage of the respective acts, upon the presumed intent that the legislatures desired prospective effect only. See Ashley v. Brown, 198 N. C. 369, 151 S. E.
725 (1930); Kurland v. Chernobil, 260 N. Y. 254, 183 N. E. 380 (1932); Continental Casualty Co. v. Nelson, 147 Misc. 560, 264 N. Y. S. 560 ( 1933); O'Donnell
v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 283 Mass. 375, 186 N. E. 657 (1933).
One statute in express terms excludes retroactive effect: W. Va. Acts (1937),
c. 47, p. 200, Code Ann. (1937), § 5555 (6).
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tion; there is a tendency to demand the same meticulous attention to
details required of service by publication. 25 This trend seems to be
based upon a misconception. Under these statutes service of process is
practically always made upon the "agent" within the jurisdiction of the
court. In addition, notice to the nonresident defendant must be given
in some form likely to afford him actual knowledge of the service upon
the "agent." The validity of such notice should be tested by the result
likely to be obtained rather than by attention to absolute statutory
detail.
Despite this strict construction in general, some courts take a practical attitude toward the requirement that the defendant sign the return
registry receipt. Service of notice has been upheld where the return
receipt has been signed by an agent of the defendant 26 and where the
wife signed for the husband. 21 The West Virginia statute specifies that
the return receipt may be signed by the defendant or his duly authorized agent. 28 This construction seems correct: if notice is received
either by an agent or an immediate member of the family, the probabilities are that the defendant will have actual notice.
It should have been contemplated originally that an alert defendant
might refuse to receive an unexpected piece of registered mail. The
statutes in Colorado, Pennsylvania and West Virginia have provided
against a refusal to receive the registered notice. If the act of refusal
25 Felstead v. Eastern Shore Express, Inc., 5 W. W. Harr. (35 Del.) 171, 160
A. 910 (1932); Syracuse Trust Co. v. Keller, 5 W.W. Harr. (35 Del.) 304, 165 A.
327 (1932) (letter containing notice received and receipted for but a failure to
file. the return receipt; motion to quash service was sustained). In Fischer v. Eby,
272 Ky. 545, II4 S. W. (2d) 763 (1938) a more reasonable view prevailed. Service
was attacked because the letter of the secretary of state and the return of the sheriff
did not state that the copy of the petition sent to defendant was an attested copy. The
court replied that the presumption that the officer did his duty prevailed over the
failure to state complete details. Cf. Corbitt v. Stolwein, (D. C. Ohio, 1935) 17 F.
Supp. 760.
26 Syracuse Trust Co. v. Keller, 5 W. W. Harr. (35 Del.) 304, 165 A. 327
(1932).
27 Employers' Liability Assurance Corp., Ltd. v. Perkins, 169 Md. 269, 181
A. 436 (1935). The case seems to be based upon a doctrine of presumed agency, but
the wife's act need not have been authorized. The true rationale of the decision
probably is that the wife's act rendered it reasonably likely that the husband would
be informed of the pending action. See note, 84 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 662 (1936).
28 W. Va. Acts (1937), c. 47, p. 199, Code Ann. (1937), § 5555 (1) (a).
By par. (c) (1) of the same section, a duly authorized agent is defined to include a
member of the family of the nonresident or any other person at the residence or place
of business who usually receives and receipts for mail addressed to such nonresident.
See extended discussion of the West Virginia statute by Professor Dickinson, 43 W. VA.
L. Q. 316 (1937).
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is supported by adequate evidence, the sending of the notice by registered mail alone shall be sufficient. 29 Independently of statute, in liVax
v. Van Marter, 80 a Pennsylvania court held that refusal to receive the
registered letter was sufficient evidence that the defendant had reasonable notice of the action.
If such a refusal to receive the letter is based upon an intention
to evade the effect of the service statute because of a knowledge or
suspicion of its contents, the decision seems sound. If a refusal is
innocent or made by an agent who does not feel competent to sign his
principal's name, the refusal is not presumptive that the defendant
has knowledge or that there has been a reasonable probability of
knowledge. However, if the procedure for giving notice is fair as a
whole, it meets the test of due process. This conclusion is made more
positive in any state where a return of service may be attacked by a
nonresident defendant who actually has no knowledge, or, what
amounts to the same thing, has in good faith refused to sign a receipt.81
A noteworthy development among the new and amended statutes
provides a better alternative method of giving notice than making the
refusal to accept the registered notice the equivalent of notice. 82 If a

a

29

Colo. Sess. Laws ( I 93 7), c. 92, § 3; 7 5 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, Supp. 193 7),

§ 1202; W. Va. Acts (1937), c. 47, p. 199, Code Ann. (1937), § 5555 (1) (a).
Texas has adopted the plan of sending the registered notices marked plainly on the
envelope "To be delivered to the addressee only." This obviated the difficulty of
showing that the party signing for the receipt was authorized to do so.
80
124 Pa. Super. 573, 198 A. 537 (1937). The court seems to proceed upon
the assumption that defendant's scheme was to evade service by refusing to accept the
letter. See note, 85 UNiv. PA. L. REV. 739 (1937). For the discussion of this problem in the author's previous article, see 32 M1cH. L. REv. 325 at 339, 340 (1934).
81 Even in Pennsylvania, where the sheriff's return is conclusive, a nonresident
may attack the return and show his nonresidence by evidence dehors the record.
Vaughn v. Love, 324 Pa. 276, 188 A. 299 (1936). Indeed, if a judgment had been
obtained against the nonresident defendant, and the judgment creditor sought to
enforce the judgment at the residence of the judgment debtor, the jurisdiction of the
original court would be open to question under the full faith and credit clause. See
Knowles v. Gaslight & Coke Co., 19 Wall. (86 U.S.) 58 (1873).
82
Ala. Gen. Acts (1935), No. 32, § I, p. 63, Code (Cum. Supp. 1936), §
9454 (1); Ariz. Rev. Code Ann. (Supp. 1936), § 1672S (a); Colo. Sess. Laws
(1937), c. 92, § 3; Kan. Gen. Stat. (1935), § 8-402; Mont. Laws (1937), c. 10,
§ 4; Wyo. Sess. Laws (1935), c. 43, § 1.
Among the amended statutes, see Mass. Acts (1928), c. 344, Ann. Laws (1932),
c. 90, § 3C; N. J. Laws (1933), c. 69, p. 131, Rev. Stat. (1937), § 39: 7-3 (d, e);
N. Y. Laws (1930), c. 57, 62A N. Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, Supp. 1938), §
52; R. I. Laws (1931), c. 1753, pp. 186-187.
The phraseology varies, but the statutes authorize service "outside the state"
or in the "state where the defendant is found."
Statutes in Alabama and Colorado, among the new, and New Jersey and Massa-
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plaintiff cannot locate the nonresident defendant through the mails
or if it is more convenient, he may have a copy of the process and
pleadings served upon the defendant in person. Several of these statutes
authorize personal notice upon the defendant wherever he may be
found. This permits a plaintiff to discover the defendant's whereahouts and make a personal delivery of the notice. Thereby the defendant is prevented from evading the operation of the statute which he
might otherwise do by refusing the registered letter. The District of
Columbia Code authorizes an unusual alternative method of giving
notice. Personal notice may be given to the defendant in the same manner as personal service of process is made in service by publication.38
The new statutes continue to require the plaintiff to send "forthwith" 34 notice of service and a copy of the complaint to the defendchusetts, among the amended, provide for service of notice where the defendant may
be found. (Citations supra.) This seems to include the territorial limits of the state
where the accide~t occurs. But such provisions, as to this circumstance, are superflous.
Personal service of process could be made under such facts.
Provisions vary considerably regarding who may give notice. In general, notice
may be given by a process officer in the state where the defendant may be found, and
less generally notice may be given either by the process officer or the plaintiff. A
return of service is usually required from the officer and an affidavit from the plaintiff.
New Jersey has an interesting provision for service within the state. N. J. Rev.
Stat. (1937), § 37:7-8. Service is permitted upon any chaffeur or operator of the
vehicle causing the collision or of any other motor vehicle of such nonresident while it
is being operated within the state. In addition, process may be served upon any person
over the age of 14 who has custody of such motor vehicle, whether for operation or
security, providing a copy of the process is posted in a conspicuous place upon such
motor vehicle. ·
The statutory provision for posting was adversely criticized in Lepre v. Real
Estate Land Title Trust Co., (N. J. C. P. 1933) 168 A. 858.
88 D. C. Code (Supp. 1937), tit. 6, § 255b, by publication as authorized by tit.
24, § 378. Sec. 378 authorizes personal notice to the defendant outside the District of
Columbia. By itself, § 378 in authorizing personal notice to the defendant is no more
objectionable than other statutes authorizing personal notice, but § 378 refers to §
38·1 which permits publication in a paper for three successive weeks of process against
nonresidents, coupled with the mailing of such published notice to defendant's last
known place of residence. If tit. 6, § 255b is intended to incorporate § 378 of tit. 24
and all connected sections, then a constitutional issue might be raised. However, as is
more likely, if Congress intended merely to authorize as an alternative method of
service personal notice to the defendant solely by the method prescribed by 378 of
tit. 24, then there can be no constitutional objection to its use.
· 34 In all of the new statutes except Kansas the word "forthwith" is used. In Kansas the plaintiff has to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the trial judge, by affidavit, that
the- defendant is within the class covered by the statute and that the address given is
as nearly correct as it is possible for plaintiff to discover. Then the judge makes an
order directing that service of process be made upon defendant under the terms of
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ant.85 Likewise the party sending notice is required to file an affidavit of
compliance with the provisions of the statute.86
ScoPE OF LIABILITY-PARTIES DEFENDANT

The accepted view, in the absence of statute, is that a defendant
must be an actual nonresident of the state when the accident occurs.87
the statute, and the duty devolves upon the serving officer to give the notice. Kan.
Gen. Stat. Ann. (1935), § 8-402.
The meaning of the term "forthwith" has been before the courts for interpretation. In Webb Packing Co. v. Harmon, (Del. Super. Ct. 1937) 196 A. 158 at
163, the court, by way of dictum, said: "the statute, reasonably construed, means that
the notice must be sent with all reasonable dispatch after the return of service, and,
in any event, before the rule day for filing the declaration." This language is not
applicable to the facts of the case because the action was filed in 1934 and notice was
not sent until 1937. Obviously the court did not have jurisdiction over the cause
in 1937.
In Reynolds v. Dorrance, (C. C. A. 4th, 1938) 94 F. (2d) 184, a more elastic
definition under the Virginia law was adopted: "due diligence under all the circumstances." Here notice was sent to the wrong address in June with the return day in
August, and later in July the correct address was obtained. New notices were sent. The
court refused to quash the service. For a note on the Virginia statute, see 22 VA. L.
REv. 477 (1936).
85 In Arizona, Colorado, District of Columbia, Montana, North Dakota and
Wyoming the plaintiff sends the notice. In Georgia either the plaintiff or the secretary of state may send the notice. A public officer sends the notice in Alabama, Virginia
and West Virginia.
In the cases where the matter has been considered, the courts have held that
personal sending of notice and filing of affidavits by the person named in the statute is
not jurisdictional. Allen v. Campbell, (La. App. 1932) 141 So. 827; Brammall v.
LaRose, 105 Vt. 345, 165 A. 916 (1933). Both cases held that the duty could be
performed by the plaintiff either in person or through an agent or attorney.
Of course, once notice has been received, it becomes the duty of the defendant
to ascertain the procedure of the forum in making the next move. See Barbieri v.
Pandiscio, n6 Conn. 48, 163 A. 469 (1932).
However, the notice itself must apparently call attention to the fundamental
portion of the statute giving authority to serve such notice, particularly the section
declaring that such service is the equivalent of personal service within the state. See
Biddle v. Boyd, (Del. 1937) 193 A. 593; Webb Packing Co. v. Harmon, (Del. Super.
Ct. 1937) 193 A. 596, 196 A. 158.
86 In Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, District of Columbia~ Georgia, Montana, and
North Dakota, an affidavit accompanied by the return receipt of the defendant must
be filed with the court. If the defendant refuses to accept the mail, Colorado permits
the filing of the returned letter in place of the receipt. In Kansas, Virginia and
Wyoming the affidavit alone is required. The West Virginia statute dispenses with
the affidavit, but requires the auditor to file the defendant's return receipt, or, in case
of a refusal, the letter bearing the stamp of the post office department that delivery
has been refused, with the clerk of the court from which the process issued.
87 Suit v. Shailer, (D. C. Me. 1937) 18 F. Supp. 568. A motion was sustained
to quash service of process under a nonresident service statute under these facts:
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It is the actual residence of the defendant, not the temporary abode
at the time of the accident, which seems to control.38 It is immaterial
whether an actual nonresident has been required to or has registered
his motor vehicle under the laws of the state where the accident occurs.39
Several states now provide that a removal from the state after the
accident renders the defendant subject to the provisions of the law
governing service of process upon nonresident motorists. 40 Scarcely
D was the wife of a naval officer detailed in Maryland and was involved in an accident
in 1934. In 1936 the officer was moved to California, and thereupon an action was
begun against the wife under the nonresident motorist statute.
By Mont. Laws (1937), c. 10, § 3, the secretary of state may be served in an
action against any person growing out of his operation of a motor vehicle in the
state, provided the operator is not a nonresident and cannot with due diligence be
served personally in Montana. Another section of the chapter deals specifically with
nonresidents.
38
Bigham v. Foor, 201 N. C. 14, 158 S. E. 548 (1931). In this case a resident
of Charleston, S. C., driving a car registered fa South Carolina, spent the summer of
1929 in North Carolina where the accident occurred. She was held to be a nonresident
of North Carolina.
39
In Mann v. Humphrey's Admx., 257 Ky. 647, 79 S. W. (2d) 17 (1934),
Mann lived in Chicago, although the true& was operated in Kentucky and bore a
Kentucky license tag. Motion to quash service of summons was overruled. In State
ex rel. Penick & Ford v. Civil Court of Record of Duval County, 127 Fla. 331, 171
So. 516 (1936), the court declared that it was immaterial whether a nonresident was
required to take a special Florida license.
These cases seem correctly decided. The fact that a motor vehicle may be
licensed in a state has no bearing upon the ability of a resident plaintiff to ,secure
effective redress against the nonresident owner. The statutory process is still necessary
for an effective remedy.
Statutes deal with this matter in a variety of ways. Colo. Sess. Laws (1937), c.
92, § 3, defines a nonresident as any natural person, firm, association, co-partnership,
corporation or other legal entity not residing within the state- "Mass. Ann. Stat. (1932),
c. 90, § 3D, requires every registrant of a motor vehicle or trailer to file an irrevocable
power of attorney agreeing that service upon the public officer is as effective as
personal service. The New Jersey statute provides that every nonresident owner required
to register his car in New Jersey shall file a similar consent. N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937),
§ 39: 3-7.
40 This provision is relatively rare. Arizona has the only new statute making such
a provision. Ariz. Rev. Code Ann. (Supp. 1936), § 1672r (b). The statutes in New
York, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, have been amended to cover such a situation. N. Y.
Laws (1931), c. 154, 62 AN. Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, Supp. 1938), § 52-a;
Pa. Laws (1931), p. 50, No. 42, § 3, 75 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, Supp. 1937) §
1205; Wis. Laws (1931), c. 146, Stat. (1937), § 85.05 (3), (4). The Pennsylvania
statute also covers the circumstance of a resident concealing himself from process
servers.
There is one case interpreting § 52-a of the New York statutes which provides
for service where a resident has removed from the state prior to the action and has
been absent for more than 30 days continuously. The defendant in question was
temporarily absent at college outside New York. The court said that the statute was
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any objection can be made to such asserted jurisdiction. Obviously, if
a person who is a nonresident and therefore only temporarily and
transitorily subject to the jurisdiction of a state may constitutionally
be served with process in actions growing out of accidents happening
within the state, one who has been subject to the jurisdiction by virtue
of his residence within the state cannot object to the constitutionality of
such legislation. In other words, the police power may with just as
much reason assert jurisdiction over the resident who removes after
the accident.
One of the difficulties experienced with the earlier statutes arose
from the failure of the legislatures to define clearly the scope of liability for the operation of a motor vehicle. In the absence of express
statutory clarification, there was a strong inclination to limit liability
to personal operation by the nonresident. 41 Most of the recent statutes
clear up this ambiguity. For example, the Georgia statute permits service of process in any action "against any such user, growing out of any
accident or collision in which any such nonresident user may be involved by reason of the operation by him, for him, or under his control or direction, express or implied, of a motor vehicle..•." 42 The
nonresident is, under most of the statutes,48 responsible for operation by
intended to apply to persons who changed their residence to another state and required
more than a temporary absence. Marano v. Finn, 155 Misc. 793, 281 N. Y. S. 440
(1935).
See Mont. Laws (1937), c. IO, § 3, summarized in note 37, supra.
41 Brown v. Cleveland Tractor Co., 265 Mich. 475, 251 N. W. 557 (1933);
Flynn v. Kramer, 271 Mich. 500, 261 N. W. 77 (1935); Beard v. Clark, (Tex. Civ.
App. 1935) 83 S. W. (2d) 1023. See Culp, "Process in Actions against Non-resident
Motorists," 32 M1cH. L. REv. 325 at 344-347 (1934); 34 CoL. L. REv. 950 (1934).
Nevertheless, the fact that the car is being operated within the state under a
license issued to the nonresident may raise a presumption of liability. See Lamere v.
Franklin, 149 Misc. 371,267 N. Y. S. 310 (1933).
42 Ga. Laws (1937), pt. 1, tit. 6, No. 444, § 1, p. 734. This section applies to
any nonresident person, firm or corporation.
48 Ala. Gen. Acts (1935), No. 32, § 1, p. 63, Code (Cum. Supp. 1936), §
9454 (1); Ariz. Rev. Code Ann. (Supp. 1936), § 1672r (a); D. C. Code (Supp.
1937), tit. 6, § 255b; Kan. Gen. Stat. (1935), § 8-401; N. D. Laws (1934), c. 174,
§ 1; W. Va. Acts (1935), c. 61, p. 255, Acts (1937), c. 47, p. 198, Code Ann.
(1937), § 5555 (1); Wyo. Sess. Laws (1935), c. 43, § 1. Under the language of
Colo. Sess. Laws (1937), c. 92, § 2, personal operation only seems to be within the
scope of the statutes.
It is unlikely that a statute providing liability for operation in person or by
agent covers situations where the motor vehicle is being operated with the consent of
the owner but not by an agent. Brassett v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.t
(La. App. 1934) 153 So. 471. See Day v. Bush, 18 La. App. 682, 139 So. 42 (1932).
Some courts are very willing to give a liberal interpretation to the words covering
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himself or by his agent. Five states have amended their original laws
to overcome strict construction by the courts.44
Where the agent is operating a motor vehicle registered in the
name of the nonresident, liability under these statutes is clear. Jurisdiction over the principal where the agent is operating his own automobile while soliciting business for his employer under a commission
fee arrangement is very doubtful. Some courts base their refusal to
allow service in such cases upon the theory that the agent is an independent contractor.45 Others take the view that the nonresident has no
control over the automobile. 46 A third group frankly hold that the
statute was never intended to cover such a situation.47
It is doubtful whether the police power of the state may legitimately enforce such liability upon a nonresident who does not own the
liability. In Producers' & Refiners' Corp. v. Illinois Cent. R. R., 168 Tenn. 1, 73
S. W. (2d) 174 (1934), the Tennessee court held an owner liable for operation by
his chauffeur within the state where the statute applied to "any owner, chauffeur or
operator." On the other hand, under a similar liability clause the New Jersey court
held there was no liability where the agent was allegedly operating a car which was
registered in his own name in his own work for his employers. Josephson v. Siegel, 1 IO
N. J. L. 374, 165 A. 869 (1933).
W. Va. Acts (1937), c. 47, p. 200, Code Ann. (1937), § 5555 (1) (c) (1),
defines an agent: " 'Duly authorized agent' shall mean and include among others a
person who operates a motor vehicle in this state for a non-resident as defined in this
section and act, in pursuit of business, pleasure, or otherwise, or who comes into this
state and operates a motor vehicle therein for, or with the knowledge or acquiescence
of, such non-resident••••"
44 La. Acts (1932), No. 184, § 1, amending Acts (1928), No. 86, § 1, Gen.
Stat. (Dart, 1932), § 5296, in person or by authorized employee; Mich. Pub. Acts
(1935), No. uo, amending Pub. Acts (1929), No. So, § 4790, Comp. Stat. (Mason
Supp. 1935), § 4790, by the nonresident or if so operated with his consent, express
or implied; Minn. Acts (1933), c. 351, § 5, Stat. (Mason Supp. 1936), § 2720-105,
use and operation by a nonresident or his agent; N. Y. Laws (1930), c. 94, 62A N. Y.
Consol. Laws (McKinney, Supp. 1938), § 52, operated in person or with consent
expr~ or implied; Va. Acts (1938), c. 26, p. 32, amending Va. Code Ann. (1936),
§ 2154 (70) (i), operation either in person or by an agent.
45 Kirchner v. N. & W. Overall Co., (D. C. S. C. 1936) 16 F. Supp. 915,
operation under a South Carolina statute imposing liability upon a nonresident by
reason of the operation by him, for him, or under his control or direction, express or
implied, of a motor vehicle. It should be noted that this statute is about as broad in
scope of liability as any.
Under such a statute it seems that the nonresident owner will be liable for
accidents caused by members of his family where a resident owner would be responsible under the family automobile doctrine or some similar rule. Th.e term "implied"
seems to cover implied in law, as well as in fact, situations.
46 State ex rel. J. A. Sexauer Mfg. Co. v. Grimm, 217 Wis. 422, 259 N. W.
262 (1935).
47 Wallace v. Smith, 238 App. Div. 599, 265 N. Y. S. 253 (1933).
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motor vehicle and who has no control over his agent's manner of
operation. The agent is responsible for his own torts, and if he is a
nonresident, process may be served upon him. But the necessities of
the situation hatdly justify the imposition of liability upon the nonresident employer who cannot control the method of transportation
used by the agent. Perhaps the state may compel this agent to carry
liability insurance as a condition to operating upon its highways, but
it is difficult to justify the imposition upon the nonresident employer
of a potential insurer's liability in such cases.
It frequently happens that one or both the principals in an automobile collision are killed at the time of the accident or die· from
injuries before an action can be filed and service of process made upon
them. This creates a problem which no state has yet attempted to solve
by legislation. Can the injured party sue the executor or the representative of the deceased nonresident? Several attempts have been
made to do so without success. Probably the best reason for denying
jurisdiction against the personal representative is that the process statutes do not under any reasonable interpretation make provision for
service upon them. 48 The New York Supreme Court in Vecchione v.
Palmer'9 said that the New York statutes should be construed strictly
as in derogation of the common law. Under such a rule of construction, the court properly held that service upon a foreign executor was
not contemplated by the act. Other courts have examined the question
as a problem in agency. They have refused to entertain jurisdiction on
the ground that death has revoked the agency of the public officer to
accept service of process. 50 This view is wholly consistent with the
phraseology of the statutes which are couched in terms of consent by
the nonresident. But as above pointed out, actual consent is not the
basis of jurisdiction over nonresident motorists. The courts make a
mistake when they rationalize in terms of the private law of agency.
Since the object of such legislation is to secure a reasonable mode of
48
Lepre v. Real Estate-Land Title Trust Co., (N. J. C. P. 1933) 168 A. 858;
State ex rel. Ledin v. Davison, 216 Wis. 216, 256 N. W. 718 (1934); Young v.
Potter Title & Trust Co., II5 N. J. L. 518, 181 A. 44 (1936), relying on the
opinion in the same case II4 N. J. L. 561, 178 A. 177 (1935).
49
(App. Div. 1936) 291 N. Y. S. 537.
50 Dowling v. Winters, 208 N. C. 521, 181 S. E. 751 (1935); Donnelly v.
Carpenter, 55 Ohio App. 463 at 467-468, 9 N. E. (2d) 888 (1936), stating: "It is
clear from our statutes that we have adopted the theory of agency. Such being true,
we are confronted with the well recognized rule that death ordinarily terminates agency
unless it be coupled with an interest." See notes, 36 CoL. L. REv. 681 (1936); 14,
N. C. L. REV. 368 (1936).
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redress against negligent nonresidents, it does not necessarily follow
that death of the nonresident terminates the jurisdiction of the courts
where the accident occurs. It may be conceded that a fair and reasonable construction of existing statutes does not include the personal
representative of a deceased nonresident motorist. But is there any
formula by which a state can exercise jurisdiction over the nonresident
personal representative?
The proper approach is through legislation making such statutes
specifically applicable to the personal representatives of deceased nonresidents. At the common law, generally, an administrator could not
be sued outside the state of his appointment.51 However, the Supreme
Court of Georgia, in the case of Johnson v. Jackson, 52 declared that
an Alabama administrator could be sued in Georgia. This decision is
based upon the sensible ground that all nonresidents are by statute
made subject to the jurisdiction of the Georgia courts, provided they
are personally served within the state. Since the provisions of the law
were general and did not exclude executors and administrators, the
court concluded that they were not exceptions. However, most courts
would doubtless follow the general rule as stated before.
Can a state constitutionally confer jurisdiction over foreign representatives by statute? In the New York case of McMaster v. Gould 53
the court of appeals was of the opinion that the legislature could not
constitutionally authorize suits against nonresident administrators. It
would be a denial of due process of law to exercise jurisdiction over
another official whose legal existence depends upon the statutes of
51 See Vaughan v. Northrup, 15 Pet. (40 U. S.) I (1841); Thorburn v. Gates,
(D. C. N. Y. 1915) 225 F. 613. See STUMBERG, CoNFLICT OF LAWS 410 (1937).
52 56 Ga. 326 at 328-329 (1876): "The policy of the state is to furnish her own
people with a remedy to recover their rights in her own courts, without compelling
them to go into a foreign jurisdiction to obtain their lawful and just claims. . •. Why
should the distributees of the deceased, who are citizens of this state, be compelled to
go into the foreign state of Alabama to obtain their rights.••. When a foreign executor
or administrator comes within the jurisdictional limits of this state, he is, in my judgment, liable to be sued here by the distributees of the estate which he represents, and
to be made liable to the same extent as he would be liable according to the laws of the
state in which he was appointed, and not otherwise."
In Pennsylvania the courts permit a resident creditor to sue a foreign representative. See Laughlin v. Solomon, 180 Pa. 177, 36 A. 704 (1897).
53 239 N. Y. 606, 147 N. E. 214 (1925), rehearing 240 N. Y. 379, 148 N. E.
556 (1925). The case arose, in fact, under a statute permitting the substitution of a
nonresident executor or administrator upon the death of a nonresident defendant. The
court adverts to the distinction between the source of authority of the executor and
the administrator. Is this difference sufficient to sustain a statute asserting jurisdiction
over the foreign executor?
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another state and who has no legal capacity in New York. 54 On the
other hand, statutes in Ohio 55 and Kansas 56 which per.r;nit actions
against nonresident personal representatives have been sustained. The
second view seems preferable. Admitting that the foreign representative is an officer of the court of his appointment, it does not follow that
his status as a representative ceases to exist at the state line; e.g., he
can receive payment in other jurisdictions which will be a good discharge under some circumstances. 57 The doctrine of territorial jurisdiction is fundamentally based upon considerations of policy rather
than inherent incapacity; otherwise jurisdiction over nonresident motorists could not be sustained. When a state by legislation 58 recognizes
the capacity of foreign representatives to sue and be sued in its courts,
it may in effect have waived its objections of policy to the recognition
of a status which actually exists.
But in any event these simple jurisdictional decisions are inapplicable to the nonresident motorist situation. The nonresident motorist
by the operation of his motor vehicle upon the public highways ipso
facto is subject to the jurisdiction of the local courts over controversies
growing out of its operation. The position of the nonresident representative is that of a conservator of the assets of one who but for his
decease before service of process upon a public official would have
been bound by any judgment rendered against him. There is no constitutional objection to reviving an action against the foreign executor
of a nonresident who was personally subject to the jurisdiction of the
court. 69 It seems of no greater consequence, as far as affecting the
personal representative, that an action may be maintained whether
M See Helme v. Buckelew, 229 N. Y. 363, 128 N. E. 216 (1920), upon which
McMaster v. Gould is predicated.
35
Craig v. Toledo, A. A. & N. M. R. R., 3 Ohio Dec. 146, 2 Ohio N. P.
64 (1895).
56
Manley v. Mayer, 68 Kan. 377, 75 P. 550 (1904), discussing what is now
contained in Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (1935), § 22-1308. See annotation, 40 A. L. R.
796 (1926).
57
Wilkins v. Ellett, 108 U.S. 256, 2 S. Ct. 641 (1883); Maas v. German
Savings Bank, 176 N. Y. 377, 68 N. E. 658 (1903). See Beale, "Voluntary Payment
to a Foreign Administrator," 42 HARV. L. REv. 597 (1929).
58
See Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (1935), § 22-1308: "An executor or administrator
duly appointed in any other state or country may sue or be sued in any court in this
state, in his capacity of executor or administrator, in like manner and under like restrictions as a nonresident may sue or be sued." A similar provision exists in Ohio Gen.
Code (Page Perm. Supp. 1926-1935), § 10509-160.
59
See Plimpton v. Mattakeunk Cabin Colony, Inc., (D. C. Conn. 1934) 6 F.
Supp. 72, holding that an action could be continued against the foreign executors of
a defendant.
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or not an action has been filed against the nonresident motorist before
his death. Very frequently the greatest need for redress occurs under
circumstances where one or both of the principals are killed in an
accident. Jurisdiction over the person of the nonresident is based upon
the general police power. The same need exists for an action against
the estate of the person at fault as against the living nonresident. The
police power should be capable of vesting jurisdiction over the personal
representative in any litigation growing out of the operation by a
nonresident decedent of a motor vehicle upon the highways of the
state.80
PARTIES PLAINTIFF

The West ;\Tirginia statute authorizes service of process upon the
state auditor "in any action or proceeding against him [ the nonresident], in any court of record in this state, including action or proceeding
brought by nonresident plaintiff or plaintiffs, growing out of any
accident or collision in which such nonresident may be involved" while
operating a motor vehicle upon the public highways of the state.01
This is apparently the only broad statutory definition of parties plaintiff. However, as previously pointed out,62 the courts have held that
the unrestricted language of the statutes indicated an intention of the
legislature to open the courts to all plaintiffs regardless of their residence. This same construction prevails in the recent cases.88
Some difficulty might arise if the executor or administrator of a
nonresident should bring an action under the provisions of one of these
statutes. In the absence of a general statute permitting a foreign personal representative to sue, the action could not be maintained. Rightly
8 °For a good discussion of. the problems involved in sustaining such legislation,
see note, 36 CoL. L. REV. 681 (1936). Even in New York, the courts will permit
actions against nonresident executors and administrators if there are assets within the
state. Perhaps an imperfect analogy may be drawn between assets within the state and
a cause of action against the estate over which the local courts have jurisdiction (by
statute).
61 W. Va. Acts (1937), c. 47, p. 198, Code Ann. (1937), § 5555 (1).
62 See Culp, "Process in Actions against Non-Resident Motorists," 32 M1cH. L.
REV. 325 at 347-348 (1934).
68 Beach v. D. W. Perdue Co., Inc., 5 W. W. Harr. (35 Del.) 285, 163 A.
265 (1932); Garon v. Poirier, 86 N.H. 174, 164A. 765 (1933); Sobeck v. Koellmer,
240 App. Div. 736, 265 N. Y. S. 778 (1930); Fine v. Wencke, 117 Conn, 683,
169 A. 58 (1933); Hoagland v. Dolan, 259 Ky. 1, 81 S. W. (2d) 869 (1935).
Even, in New York where the courts have discretion to refuse to entertain suits
in some cases, it has been held that there is no discretion to refuse jurisdiction where
all the parties are residents of another state. Hunter v. Hosner, 142 Misc. 382, 254
N. Y. S. 635 (1931); Malak v. Upton, 3 N. Y. S. (2d) 248 (S. Ct. 1938). Cf.
Gainer v. Donner, 140 Misc. 841, 251 N. Y. S. 713 (1931).
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considered, these process statutes are not directly concerned with parties,
and a representative would be met with the general rule that he could
not sue outside the state of his appointment.6 " Several states have statutes permitting foreign representatives to sue,65 and under such legislation the foreign executor or administrator should be able to maintain
his action.
Statutes in Florida 66 and Tennessee 67 authorize service of process
in actions filed by residents of the state. 68 This limitation of the parties
plaintiff raises a question of constitutional law relative to a denial of
the privileges and immunities of the citizens of the several states.
However, everyone concedes that this process is designed to afford the
residents of a state some relief against the predatory, nonresident
motorist. It is primarily a local problem which they are designed to
solve, and if the statute limits jurisdiction to actions filed by residents,
it does nothing more than make a reasonable discrimination between
resident and nonresident plaintiffs. Such discrimination may be dismissed either on the ground that it is actually based upon residence
and not citizenship,69 or that it is permissible even if residence and
citizenship are synonymous terms. Only unreasonable discriminations
against citizens of other states are unconstitutional. 70
6
' See Johnson v. Pow~rs, 139 U. S. 156, II S. Ct. 525 (1891); Mansfield v.
McFarland, 202 Pa. 173, 51 A. 763 (1902). See STUMBERG, CoNFLICT OF LAWS 410
(1937).
65 No attempt has been made to ascertain how many statutes have been enacted.
Statutes in Kansas and Georgia are illustrative. Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (1935), §
22-1308; Ga. Code (1933), §§ II3-2401 to II3-2402.
66
Fla. Comp. Gen. Laws (Perm. Supp. 1936), § 4274(3). Cf. § 4274(7) which
does not contain this limitation. Fla. Acts (1935), c. 17254,
67
Tenn. Code (1932), § 8671.
68
At one time the New Jersey act required plaintiff to be a resident of the state.
See Gender v. Rayburn, II9 N. J. L. 243, 195 A. 513 (1937); 20 IowA L. REV. 654
at 658 (1935). N. J. Rev. Stat. (1937), §§ 39: 7-2, 39: 3-7, do not limit the parties
plaintiff.
69
State ex rel. Cochran v. Lewis, II8 Fla. 536, 159 So. 792 (1935). The
Florida court held the restriction constitutional on the ground that discrimination was
based on residence and not upon citizenship.
The Supreme Court of the United States in Douglas v. New York, N. H. &
H. R. R., 279 U. S. 377, 49 S. Ct. 355 (1929), in an analogous situation held that
a rational distinction between residents and nonresidents, resulting in the closing of
the courts of the forum to nonresidents, did not amount to a denial of constitutional
rights.
70
See Chemung Canal Bank v. Lowery, 93 U. S. 72 at 77 (1876); Canadian
Northern Ry. v. Eggen, 252 U. S. 553 at 560, 40 S. Ct. 402 (1920); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352 at 355, 47 S. Ct. 632 (1927).
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SAFEGUARDS FOR THE DEFENDANT

All of the recent statutes 11 authorize the trial court to grant such
delay and continuance of the action as may be necessary to accord the
nonresident defendant a reasonable opportunity to defend the action.
Regrettably, there has been no recent legislative progress toward
a sincere effort to protect nonresident motorists against fraudulent and
vindictive actions. In recent years many lawyers have had the experience of a client coming to them with a letter from some attorney in
another state demanding a settlement for an accident growing out of
the operation of a motor vehicle. In some cases the client has never
been in the foreign state. If the state where the accident allegedly
occurred has no device for sifting out the false or unjustified claims,
its statute is unfair to the nonresident.
Some of the earlier statutes made an attempt to be fair in this respect by requiring a bond as a condition precedent to the filing of an
action or authorizing the taxing of defendant's reasonable expenses as
a part of the costs in the case. 72 But the New York legislature has
repealed the entire section 78 providing for security from the plaintiff,
and the Michigan statute has been amended, striking out the bond
provision and substituting an authority to charge defendant's actual
traveling expenses as costs to the plaintiff if he loses. 74 Only two of
the recent statutes make any provision for the defendant's protection. 75
71 Ala. Gen. Acts (1935), No. 32, § 1, p. 63, Code (Cum. Supp. 1936), § 9454
(1); Ariz. Rev. Code Ann. (Supp. 1936), § 1672S (a); Colo. Sess. Laws (1937),
c. 92, § 4; D. C.• Code (Supp. 1937), tit. 6, § 255b; Ga. Laws (1937), No. 444,
§ 4, p. 734; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (1935), c. 8-402; Mont. Laws (1937), c. 10,
§ 4; N. D. Laws (1935), c. 174, § 2; Va. Acts (1938), c. 26, p. 33, first enacted
in 1932; W. Va. Acts (1937), c. 47, p. 199, Code Ann. (1937), § 5555 (1) (a);
Wyo. Sess. Laws (1935), c. 43, § 1.
72 Culp, "Process in Action against Non-resident Motorists," 32 M1cH. L. REv.
325 at 350 (1934).
78 62A N. Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1929), § 53, repealed by N. Y. Laws
(1935), c. 618.
74 Mich. Pub. Acts (1935), No. 110, amending Pub. Acts 1929, No. So, Comp.
Laws (Mason Supp. 1935), § 4790. This amendment strikes out the $100 bond
provision. However, it authorizes as taxable costs, in addition to other legal costs against
the plaintiff if he loses, the actual traveling expenses of the defendant, not to exceed
$100.
75 D. C. Code (Supp. 1937), tit. 6, § 255b (1), provides for an undertaking
of the plaintiff to reimburse the defendant for his necessary expenses and reasonable
attorney's fees in case his defense prevails. W. Va. Acts (1937), c. 47, p. 199, Code
Ann. (1937), § 5555 (1) (a), requires a bond for $100 With the condition that
plaintiff will reimburse the defendant for his necessary expenses in conducting a successful defense.
Theoretically the requirement of a bond as a condition precedent is likely to be
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Apparently this class of legislation is primarily favorable to the
plaintiff. But with statutes in almost every state and with interstate
motor vehicle traffic ever increasing, the defendant's disadvantage
should be recognized. It is unfortunate that only two out of the eleven
recent statutes have recognized this fact. 76
a greater deterrent against unnecessary actions than a provision for taxing the defendant's expenses as costs if plaintiff does not succeed in the action. On the other hand,
it is hardly fair to the plaintiff to saddle him with the entire expense incurred by the
defendant in all cases. The plaintiff must face the alternative of risking heavy costs
or of not bringing his action. The original Iowa statute was commendable. Iowa Code
(1935), § 5079-d23, enacted in 1931, repealed by Iowa Acts (1937), c. 134, § 527.
It permitted the defendant's expenses to be taxed as costs if the judge was satisfied that
the action was malicious or was instituted without probable cause. Such a statute would
leave the parties to bear their own expenses where the plaintiff had a legitimate case.
An ideal statute should not limit the amount taxable for defendant's expenses as
in the recent Michigan amendment. See note 74, supra. If the plaintiff has filed an
action maliciously or without probable cause, there is no reason why such a statute
should not allow the expenses necessarily incurred by the defendant, including reasonable
attorney's fees, to be taxed as costs in the case.
76 Apparently, at least two factors are responsible. One is that such statutes have
been passed at a time when the perspective was distorted, and attention was focused
upon the situation of residents who have been injured. The other is that such statutes
have been very widely copied, and perhaps the draftsmanship was not as careful as it
might have been.
The problem of financial injury to the motor accident victim and his dependents
is a very real one. See the very complete treatment of this problem in 3 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 465-608 (1936).

